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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 We review the District Court’s denial of a renewed 
motion for certification of a proposed class of drivers who 
performed deliveries on a full-time basis using one truck for 
mattress retailer Sleepy’s LLC.  The Court held that the class 
was not ascertainable.  Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, No. 10-cv-
01138, 2019 WL 8881823, at *5–7 (D.N.J. May 9, 2019) 
(“Hargrove II”).  In addition to all the other requirements for 




requires that a Rule 23(b)(3) class also be “currently and 
readily ascertainable.”  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 687 
F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).1  Plaintiffs must show that “(1) 
the class is defined with reference to objective criteria; and (2) 
there is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for 
determining whether putative class members fall within the 
class definition.”  Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 We reverse the District Court’s order.  First, the Court 
should not have treated the renewed motion for class 
 
1 Every putative class action must satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of Rule 
23(b)(1), (2), or (3).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)–(b).  To satisfy 
Rule 23(a), 
 
(1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable” (numerosity); 
(2) there must be “questions of law or fact 
common to the class” (commonality); (3) “the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties” 
must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class” (typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs 
must “fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class” (adequacy of representation, or 
simply adequacy). 
 
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).  Additionally, Rule 23(b)(3), 
relevant here, “requires that (i) common questions of law or 
fact predominate (predominance), and (ii) the class action is 




certification as a motion for reconsideration.  “An order that 
grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended 
before final judgment.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(l)(C).  Courts 
cannot graft onto that provision the heightened motion-for-
reconsideration standard requiring that, in addition to 
satisfying the typical Rule 23 criteria, plaintiffs show there was 
a change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error.  See 
Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 
F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  District courts should treat 
renewed motions for class certification as they would initial 
motions under Rule 23.  Cf. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. 
Litig., 483 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 
Second, the District Court misapplied our 
ascertainability case law.  It was too exacting and essentially 
demanded that Appellants identify the class members at the 
certification stage.  We have held that a plaintiff need not “be 
able to identify all class members at class certification—
instead, a plaintiff need only show that ‘class members can be 
identified.’”  Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 308 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2013)).  Appellants have met that requirement.  They 
submitted thousands of pages of contracts, driver rosters, 
security gate logs, and pay statements, as well as testimony 
from a dozen class members stating they were required to work 
exclusively for Sleepy’s full-time.  “Affidavits, in combination 
with records or other reliable and administratively feasible 
means, can meet the ascertainability standard.”  City Select 
Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 441 (3d 
Cir. 2017).   
 
The Court focused on gaps in the records kept and 




records makes it more difficult to ascertain members of an 
otherwise objectively verifiable class, the employees who 
make up that class should not bear the cost of the employer’s 
faulty record keeping.  To hold otherwise is in tension with the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery 
Co., and Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, which held that 
employees bringing wage claims can meet their burdens of 
proof by “produc[ing] sufficient evidence to show the amount 
and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable 
inference.”  Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 
1040 (2016) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 
328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)).  Such inferences are necessary “to 
fill an evidentiary gap created by the employer’s failure to keep 
adequate records.”  Id. at 1047.  We extend Tyson Foods and 
Mt. Clemens to the ascertainability determination at the class-
certification stage and hold that where an employer has failed 
to keep records it was required to keep by law, employees can 
prove ascertainability by producing “sufficient evidence” to 
define their proposed class as “a matter of just and reasonable 
inference.”  Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–47 (quoting Mt. 
Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687). 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background  
1. Sleepy’s Delivery Services and the 
Proposed Class  
 
Sleepy’s was a New York-based mattress retailer.2  
Deliveries were “an integral part of its business,” J.A. 78, and 
 




so it created a comprehensive delivery process to meet its 
customer needs.  Sleepy’s operated a large warehouse in 
Robbinsville, New Jersey, that it used to deliver mattresses.  It 
ran 50 to 60 trucks daily, and as many as 85 to 90 each day 
during peak season.   
 
Appellants (the three named plaintiffs in this proposed 
class action) are individuals who performed mattress deliveries 
for Sleepy’s.  To work for Sleepy’s, they had to sign a 
standardized Independent Driver Agreement (“IDA”).  Each 
IDA “required that the deliverers could not perform any other 
business while on duty with Sleepy’s.”  J.A. 76.  It states that 
drivers are required to “agree that while performing deliveries 
for Sleepy’s [they] will not carry merchandise for any other 
business until [they] have finished the delivery manifest given 
to [them] by Sleepy’s.”  J.A. 1030.  However, the IDAs also 
state that the relationship was entered on a “non-exclusive 
basis” and that on any day Sleepy’s did not have to request, 
and no carrier had to provide, delivery services for it.  Id.  
Sleepy’s enforced these provisions; in at least one instance, it 
penalized a driver because he made a delivery for another 
business while he was delivering Sleepy’s product.   
 
Some drivers in the proposed class signed IDAs on their 
own behalf and others signed on behalf of their corporate entity 
or “carrier.”  Appellants testified that individual drivers were 
required to form business entities as a condition of their 
employment with Sleepy’s.  This was true even if the business 
entity consisted of one driver and one truck.  Appellants 
testified that, although there were some drivers who owned or 
operated two or three trucks at a time, most proposed class 
members operated one truck for significant stretches of time.  




they drove one of their trucks full time, and a relative or an 
associate drove the other.   
 
Sleepy’s emphasizes that the IDA did not obligate it to 
pay wages to a carrier’s individual owners or workers.  It paid 
each carrier for all the deliveries the carrier performed as a 
whole.3  Sleepy’s also points out that, where carriers were not 
 
3 One of the key factual disputes in this case is whether 
Sleepy’s had relationships with the drivers individually or with 
the corporate entities with which the drivers were affiliated.  
Sleepy’s points us to evidence that the IDAs were signed on 
behalf of, and payments were made to, the corporate entities.  
The proposed class members counter that they only formed 
those entities as a condition of working for Sleepy’s.   
 
Amici—the National Employment Law Project 
(“NELP”) and Toward Justice—support Appellants’ argument 
and posit that the use of LLCs to misclassify employees is a 
widespread public policy problem.   
 
[S]ome employers . . . require workers to form limited 
liability corporations . . . , individual franchises, or other 
shell businesses to get a job, even where they are clearly 
employees . . . .  [T]he employer contracts with the workers 
in their capacity as ‘owners’ or ‘partners’ of the shell 
company in order to avoid liability under labor and 
employment laws.  Companies like the LLC model 
because there are fewer reporting requirements under tax 
laws, making it harder to identify independent contractor 
misclassification.   
 




one-person limited liability companies (“LLCs”), their owners 
did not necessarily drive the truck, and that there were signers 
to IDAs who did not provide delivery services to Sleepy’s on 
a full-time basis.   
 
 Appellants brought an employee misclassification suit 
and sought certification as a class of Sleepy’s delivery drivers.  
They alleged that Sleepy’s misclassified them as independent 
contractors; because they are actually employees of Sleepy’s, 
it violated the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34:11–4.1 et seq., by making deductions from their pay for, 
among other things, damage claims, uniforms, customer 
claims, and other fines.  Also, Sleepy’s allegedly violated the 
New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a 
et seq., by failing to pay Appellants overtime when they 
worked more than 40 hours in a week.   
 
  2. Sleepy’s Records  
Sleepy’s maintained driver rosters that listed an 
identification code for each driver, how many trucks that driver 
was authorized to drive for it, and whom it authorized to drive 
each truck.  The driver identification codes were used by 
Sleepy’s computer software system to design daily delivery 
routes and assign those routes to a specific truck, including the 
approved driver for that truck.   
 
Sleepy’s also produced load sheets and manifests for 
each truck that listed the products to be delivered and listed the 
driver of that truck.  Drivers had to provide their cell phone 
numbers so that they could be called during delivery.  Their 
numbers appeared on the manifests.  Sleepy’s assigned each 




Clarke, or “5STT” for Sam Hargrove).  J.A. 1123–24.  If a 
driver operated more than one truck, Sleepy’s assigned an 
additional number after the letter code.  Typical was Plaintiff 
Marco Eusebio, whose driver code was “5ETC.”  J.A. 1123.  
At times he operated three trucks for Sleepy’s, and his 
secondary trucks were assigned the codes “5ETC2” and 
“5ETC3.”  Id.  The driver roster can thus be used to link each 
truck to a particular driver.  
 
Sleepy’s also generated in digital form “Outside Carrier 
Expense Detail” reports for each driver.  These display the 
driver’s identifier (which is identical to the driver identification 
assigned to the driver on the driver rosters), the number of 
deliveries assigned to the driver each day, the number of 
deliveries completed each day, the amounts paid, and the 
amounts and reason for any deductions from the driver’s pay.  
 
Each driver also was required to sign in at a security 
gate when he arrived at the Sleepy’s facility in Robbinsville.  
The gate logs were maintained by the security guard and listed 
the driver’s identification, the time he arrived, his name, and, 
if the driver had a helper, his name.   
 
3.  Appellants’ Methods for Ascertaining Class 
Members  
 
In seeking class certification, Appellants argued they 
could piece together who the proposed class members were 
from Sleepy’s available records.  Appellants’ counsel reviewed 
the driver rosters, pay statements, and gate logs that Sleepy’s 
produced in discovery and concluded that during the applicable 
class period, from 2007 to 2016, approximately 193 




New Jersey and personally performed deliveries on a full-time 
basis.  Of those, 111 individuals operated only one truck for at 
least six months during that period.  Twelve of the currently 
proposed class members operated only one truck for at least six 
months for Sleepy’s.   
 
Appellants posit that their class can thus be identified 
by lining up the Outside Carrier Expense Detail reports, which 
show the days a driver performed deliveries by their assigned 
identification code, with the gate logs for corresponding dates, 
which show who was the driver for the truck that day.  They 
included samples of those documents for six proposed class 
members, packaging their gate logs, driver rosters, and pay 
statements for the same days, which taken together show that 
those drivers performed multiple deliveries for Sleepy’s on 
days they signed in at the gate.   
 
For example, Appellants compared the relevant 
documents, specifically the gate logs and the pay statements, 
for named plaintiff Sam Hargrove, with his testimony, to show 
it corroborated that he worked full-time for Sleepy’s, 
performing many deliveries per day, five to six days a week.  
From June 19, 2008 to November 1, 2008, the pay statements 
showed that Hargrove operated one truck for Sleepy’s and was 
paid for deliveries performed on 69 days during that period.  
The gate logs for ten of those days are admittedly missing and 
another driver filled in for Hargrove on two days.  Appellants 
posit that this process of lining up documents can be replicated 
for each proposed class member.  
 
Sleepy’s counters that there are substantial gaps in the 
record that foreclose class certification.  For example, it argues 




a small window in 2008–2009, and that these documents 
cannot support certification for the proposed class period from 
2007 to 2016.  It claims as well that it made a broad range of 
documents available, but that Appellants’ counsel only copied 
a narrow subset.  The parties engaged in discovery in 2010 and 
2011.  Sleepy’s produced Outside Carrier Expense Detail 
reports for all carriers making deliveries from 2007 to 2010.  It 
also provided access to all the gate logs it had.  Sleepy’s 
concedes that the gate logs, “if completed properly,” “would 
reflect the date and time an individual entered and departed 
from the Robbinsville facility.”  Sleepy’s Br. 8 (citing J.A. 
1000).  During a second round of discovery, Sleepy’s produced 
additional data regarding payments and deductions made to 
carriers from 2011 through 2016.   
 
 Appellants counter that they provided evidence outside 
of the 2008–2009 period.  Included was testimony from 
multiple members of the putative class who claim they had to 
sign in on the gate logs every morning during the entire class 
period.  Moreover, Sleepy’s has suggested that it had, or was 
trying to obtain, gate logs spanning from 2008 to 2016.  As for 
the claim that only a narrow range of documents were copied, 
Appellants posit that, when their counsel went to Sleepy’s 
facility to examine the logs, they were in hard-copy form and 
counsel were not permitted to take the documents out of the 
facility or to stay beyond 6:00 p.m.  Nonetheless they were able 
to scan thousands of pages of gate logs that are in evidence.  
The parties dispute the significance of these gaps in the record.  






B. Procedural Background  
1.  Filing of the Class Action and Ruling on the 
Merits   
 
Appellants filed their class action complaint in March 
2010.  After preliminary discovery, the District Court granted 
Sleepy’s motion for summary judgment, holding that, under 
then-controlling New Jersey law, the drivers were independent 
contractors and not employees.  Appellants appealed to us, and 
in May 2015 we vacated and remanded so that the District 
Court could apply the proper test adopted by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in response to a certified question from us.  
Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449 (N.J. 2015).  
 
On remand, the parties filed partial cross-motions for 
summary judgment on whether the named plaintiffs were 
employees or independent contractors.  The District Court 
granted Appellants’ motion and denied Sleepy’s motion, 
holding that the three named plaintiffs were employees of 
Sleepy’s.  Specifically, it held that Sleepy’s exercised 
considerable control over the work of the drivers under the 
IDAs; they performed deliveries within Sleepy’s usual course 
of business; by reporting to and working in the Robbinsville 
facility each morning and performing deliveries on routes 
designed by Sleepy’s, the drivers worked in Sleepy’s places of 
business; and they could not operate independent businesses 
because Sleepy’s required them to work full-time and their 
IDAs barred them from performing deliveries for other 
businesses.   
 
Thus the District Court has already held on summary 




Hall, and Marco Eusebio—were misclassified as independent 
contractors and instead are employees of Sleepy’s.  The issues 
of class certification and damages were not decided.   
 
  2. The First Motion to Certify  
Appellants thereafter filed their first motion for class 
certification for a proposed class of 193 individuals who 
contracted with Sleepy’s and performed deliveries on a full-
time basis.  They argued the class was ascertainable because 
all of the class members signed contracts with Sleepy’s, were 
listed on the driver rosters, were identified on the daily delivery 
manifests, all signed in with a Sleepy’s security guard in a gate 
log each morning, all of the deductions Sleepy’s took from the 
drivers’ pay were listed in their pay statements, and Sleepy’s 
kept track of each driver’s deliveries using scanner data.  
Appellants also produced testimony showing that Sleepy’s 
assigned drivers a full shift of work each day and prohibited 
any driver from making deliveries for other businesses while 
making deliveries for it, so that, as a practical matter, the 
drivers could only work exclusively for Sleepy’s.   
 
In February 2018, however, the District Court denied 
Appellants’ motion without prejudice.  Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, 
LLC, No. 10-cv-01138, 2018 WL 1092457 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 
2018) (“Hargrove I”).  The Court held that Appellants had not 
demonstrated the ascertainability of the proposed class.  In 
assessing whether class membership could be ascertained from 
the driver rosters, pay statements, and gate logs, it noted that 
Sleepy’s “acknowledges those records identify the drivers,” id. 
at *7, yet held that the available documents did not show which 
multiple-truck drivers were working on a full-time basis.  The 




gate logs, they “[were] not fully completed.  Sometimes the 
time a truck entered the facility (time-in) and the time it left the 
facility (time-out) [were] not recorded.  As a result, there are 
gaps in listing time-in or time-out of the facility for the trucks 
and the drivers.”  Id.  Additionally, the Court held that it could 
not ascertain who was a member of the class for the purpose of 
Appellants’ claim for deductions because so many of the 
carriers were LLCs, stating that there “is no way of knowing . 
. . whether any carrier reduced any driver[’]s pay by deducting 
Sleepy’s listed deductions.”  Id. at *8.  And the Court stated it 
could not ascertain the class members who had overtime claims 
because “there is no way of knowing whether the carrier paid 
drivers overtime.”  Id.   
 
  3. The Renewed Motion to Certify  
Appellants filed a renewed motion for certification of a 
class of only the 111 individuals who performed deliveries on 
a full-time basis and who drove one truck for Sleepy’s.  Those 
individuals included 73 drivers who ran only one truck for 
Sleepy’s, and an additional 38 drivers who ran one truck for at 
least six months even though they operated more than one 
truck on other occasions.   
 
The District Court denied the renewed motion for class 
certification in May 2019.  Hargrove II, 2019 WL 8881823.  
First, it construed the motion as a motion for reconsideration.  
Under the standard of review for reconsideration motions, it 
would reconsider its prior denial of class certification only if 
Appellants pointed to “(1) an intervening change in the 
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was 
not available when the court granted the motion . . . ; or (3) the 




injustice.”  Id. at *3.  It ruled that Appellants demonstrated 
none of these circumstances.  Id.   
 
The Court nonetheless engaged in the Rule 23 
certification analysis, and held that the narrower class was still 
not ascertainable because the records kept by Sleepy’s 
regarding the identity of the drivers lacked critical information.  
Id. at *6.  Much like its February 2018 ruling in Hargrove I, it 
determined that the driver rosters, pay statements, and gate logs 
failed to show who worked on a full-time basis; thus it was 
“unable to determine if Sleepy’s was the only company the 
drivers worked for.”  Id. at *5. Additionally, the Court found 
that the gate logs were not provided for “the full class period,” 
and there was no evidence that those documents existed.  Id. at 
*6.  Moreover, Appellants could not show “which potential 
class members were subject to improper deductions and which 
potential class members worked over forty hours per week 
without being paid over-time.”  Id.  And that “while 
determining the amount of deductions may be simple based on 
the [pay statements], the documents still do not allow the Court 
to determine whether the drivers actually suffered a 
deduction.”  Id.   
  
Appellants thereafter sought leave to appeal the District 
Court’s denial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), and we granted 






A. Standard Applied to Renewed Motions for 
Class Certification  
 
Appellants argue that the District Court erred in treating 
their renewed motion for class certification as a motion for 
reconsideration, and that it instead should have treated it as an 
independent motion for class certification.5   
 
We have not previously decided what standard applies 
when reevaluating an initial denial of a motion for certification.  
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1332(a), and 1332(d)(2).  We have jurisdiction over 
this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). 
 
5 Our dissenting colleague would hold that Appellants 
forfeited the issue of whether the District Court applied the 
wrong standard of review.  Dissent. Op. 1.  But the cases he 
cites involved arguments and issues that were forfeited because 
they were only raised for the first time in a reply brief, see 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33, 53 (3d Cir. 
2016), or only in footnotes, see John Wyeth & Bro. v. CIGNA 
Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997).  That is 
not what we have here.  Appellants raised the argument in their 
opening brief, see Hargrove et al. Br. 11 n.12, and then 
elaborated in detail in their Reply, see Hargrove et al. Reply 8–
9.  And the District Court expressly discussed and ruled on the 
standard-of-review issue.  Hargrove, 2019 WL 8881823, at 
*2–3.  Cf. Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 607 




District courts in our Circuit have applied different standards.  
Some have held that “the best course of action is to treat the 
present [m]otion like any other for class certification, and to 
apply the usual Rule 23 standard.”  Carrow v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys., Inc., No. 16-cv-3026, 2019 WL 7184548, at *4 
(D.N.J. Dec. 26, 2019).  Per Rule 23(c)(1)(C), “[a]n order that 
grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended 
before final judgment.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C).  In our 
case, the Court required Appellants not only to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 23, but also to show that (1) there had 
been “an intervening change in controlling law;” (2) “new 
evidence” had become available; or (3) there was “the need to 
correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.”  
Max’s Seafood Cafe, 176 F.3d at 677.  
 
Sleepy’s cites a case from the Second Circuit and cases 
from district courts in our Circuit as support that courts 
uniformly apply the motion for reconsideration standard, but it 
mischaracterizes the holdings of those cases.  The holding of 
In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 483 F.3d 70 
 
waiver” is whether the proceedings “put the [d]istrict [c]ourt 
on notice of the legal argument”); see also Bagot v. Ashcroft, 
398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005) (“This Court has 
discretionary power to address issues that have been waived.”).  
There is no argument here that the parties did not have fair 
notice of this contention, cf. In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. 
(No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to 
consider argument raised in a footnote because “it fail[ed] to 
give fair notice of the claims being contested on appeal”), or 
that Sleepy’s did not have an opportunity to respond.  Indeed 
it responded to the standard-of-review argument at length.  




(2d Cir. 2007), was that district courts may consider a motion 
to alter or amend a class certification ruling anytime before 
final judgment, id. at 73, and not that those courts should apply 
the motion-for-reconsideration standard.  The Second Circuit 
specifically noted that “[n]othing in our decision precludes the 
Petitioners from returning to the District Court to seek 
certification of a more modest class, one as to which the Rule 
23 criteria might be met.”  Id.   
 
Sleepy’s also cites In re Tropicana Orange Juice 
Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, No. 11-cv-7382, 2018 
WL 6819331, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2018), but there the Court 
merely stated that district courts have discretion to consider 
renewed motions for class certification and not that the 
reconsideration standard applies; in fact, it applied only the 
Rule 23 analysis without any reference to the reconsideration 
standard.  Id. at *2–3.   
 
District courts outside our Circuit are also split on this 
issue.  Compare Remington v. Newbridge Sec. Corp., No. 13-
cv-60384, 2014 WL 505153, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2014) 
(declining to “construe [plaintiff’s] renewed request for class 
certification as one for reconsideration”), with Torrent v. 
Yakult U.S.A., Inc., No. 15-cv-124, 2016 WL 6039188, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2016) (applying the “stringent law of the 
case standard [for a] motion[] to reconsider” to a renewed 
motion for class certification) (quoting Anderson Living Tr. v. 
WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 308 F.R.D. 410, 438 (D.N.M. 
2015)).  But the courts that apply the motion-for-
reconsideration standard do so despite the language of Rule 
23(c)(1)(C), which states that “[a]n order that grants or denies 
class certification may be altered or amended before final 




improperly given a “second bite at the apple” by relitigating 
the class-certification issue.  See Anderson Living Tr., 308 
F.R.D. at 438.  
 
Concern about parties getting a second opportunity, 
however, cannot override the language of Rule 23(c)(1)(C), 
which allows for multiple bites at the apple throughout the 
litigation, and that does not impose an additional requirement 
on parties to prove a change in law or show new evidence to 
succeed on a renewed motion for certification.  The Rule does 
not distinguish between a renewed motion for certification 
based on new evidence and one based on a more narrow and 
clearer definition of a class that meets the requirements of Rule 
23.  As a practical matter, we know no reason why plaintiffs 
who can cabin more clearly their class, and meet the other Rule 
23 requirements, should be barred from succeeding on a 
renewed motion.    
 
Accordingly, we decline to import the stringent motion-
for-reconsideration standard to a renewed motion for class 
certification under Rule 23(c)(1)(C).  “[T]he best course of 
action is to treat [renewed motions] like any other for class 
certification, and to apply the usual Rule 23 standard.”  
Carrow, 2019 WL 7184548, at *4.  Plaintiffs can succeed on a 
renewed motion for class certification if they more clearly 
define their proposed class even if there has been no change in 
the law and no new evidence produced.  
 
The District Court thus erred by treating Appellants’ 
renewed motion for class certification as a motion for 
reconsideration.  Its application of that standard was not, 




other Rule 23 criteria and found Appellants’ proposed class 
was not ascertainable.  We thus proceed to review that ruling.6   
 
“We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Byrd, 784 
F.3d at 161 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
We review de novo the legal standard applied.  Id.   
 
B. Ascertainability  
  1.  The Rule 23 Legal Framework  
As noted, in our Circuit a Rule 23(b)(3) class must also 
be “currently and readily ascertainable based on objective 
criteria.”  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593.  The plaintiff has the 
burden of making this showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and a district court must “undertake a rigorous 
analysis of the evidence to determine if the standard is met.”  
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306.  However, a plaintiff need not “be 
able to identify all class members at class certification—
instead, a plaintiff need only show that ‘class members can be 
 
6 Sleepy’s correctly points out that the only order on 
appeal before us is the District Court’s May 2019 order 
denying Appellants’ renewed motion for certification and that 
Appellants did not seek interlocutory review of the February 
2018 order denying their initial motion.  However, in the May 
2019 order, the Court expressly incorporates portions of the 
February 2018 order.  See Hargrove II, 2019 WL 8881823, at 




identified.’”  Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 n.2).  
 
We have analyzed the ascertainability standard in detail 
on several occasions.  We first addressed it in Marcus v. BMW 
of North America LLC, in which the plaintiff proposed a class 
of New Jersey purchasers of BMW vehicles equipped with 
“run-flat tires” that had “gone flat and been replaced” during 
the class period.  687 F.3d at 592.  This definition presented 
serious ascertainability issues.  First, the vehicles were 
manufactured by a foreign subsidiary who was not a party to 
the action, so that defendant did not have access to records of 
which vehicles were equipped with the defective tires.  Id. at 
593.  Second, dealerships regularly replaced the run-flat tires 
with regular tires, and the plaintiff did not present a method of 
obtaining records from individual dealerships.  Id. at 593–94.  
Finally, the plaintiff limited the class to purchasers of BMWs 
whose tires had “gone flat and been replaced” and did not 
propose a method of determining who met this part of the class 
definition.  Id. at 594.  Because the answer to each of these 
questions was left to “potential class members’ say so,” we 
remanded to the District Court to consider “the critical issue of 
whether the defendants’ records can ascertain class members 
and, if not, whether there is a reliable, administratively feasible 
alternative.”  Id. 
 
In Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., we considered claims 
brought by a putative class of New Jersey retail discount club 
customers who purchased goods with extended warranties.  
725 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 2013).  The proposed class 
definition included all customers who purchased a “Service 
Plan to cover as-is products,” but it excluded customers whose 




was a last-one item . . . who obtained service on their product, 
and . . . who have previously been reimbursed for the cost of 
the Service Plan.”  Id. at 353.  We noted that this class 
definition required separate factual inquiries to determine class 
membership: “(1) whether a Sam’s Club member purchased a 
Service Plan for an as-is item, (2) whether the as-is item was a 
‘last one’ item or otherwise came with a full manufacturer’s 
warranty, and (3) whether the member nonetheless received 
service on the as-is item or a refund of the cost of the Service 
Plan.”  Id. at 356.  We remanded so that the plaintiff could 
propose reliable and administratively feasible methods of 
answering these questions without requiring “extensive and 
individualized fact-finding.”  Id. 
 
In Carrera v. Bayer Corp., the District Court certified a 
class composed of all purchasers of a particular over-the-
counter diet supplement during several years in Florida.  727 
F.3d at 304.  Defendants were the drug manufacturers, and they 
did not have access to any retailer records that could have 
established which customers purchased the drug during the 
pertinent time period.  Id.  The plaintiff proposed using 
“retailer records of online sales and sales made with store 
loyalty or rewards cards,” combined with affidavits from 
potential class members.  Id.  But the plaintiff had not sought, 
nor obtained, the proposed records during class discovery.  See 
id. at 308–09.  We determined that it was inappropriate to 
certify the class without further inquiry into the nature and 
extent of the available records.  Id. at 309.  In addition, we 
noted that, even if the proposed records did exist, there was no 
evidence that a “single purchaser,” let alone the whole class, 
could be identified using them.  Id.  We remanded so that the 




was a reliable and administratively feasible means of 
determining class membership.  Id. at 312. 
 
In Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., we considered claims brought 
by individuals who leased computers with spyware that was 
installed and activated without their consent.  784 F.3d at 160.  
The class definition included both the lessees and their 
household members.  Id.  Defendants kept detailed records 
enabling identification of the lessees.  Id. at 169.  We 
concluded that identification of the household members was 
unlikely to pose “serious administrative burdens that are 
incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class action.”  
Id. at 170 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593).  “Any form used 
to indicate a household member’s status in the putative class 
must be reconciled with the 895 known class members or some 
additional public records.” Id. at 171. 
 
Most recently, in City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW of 
North America, we vacated and remanded a district court 
ruling that a proposed class of car dealers who received 
unsolicited faxes from a credit agent was not ascertainable 
because a database of the dealers did not list which ones 
actually received the fax.  867 F.3d at 441.  We vacated for two 
reasons:  
 
First, our ascertainability precedents do not 
categorically preclude affidavits from potential 
class members, in combination with the 
Creditsmarts database, from satisfying the 
ascertainability standard.  Second, because the 
Creditsmarts database was not produced during 
discovery, plaintiff was denied the opportunity to 




feasible method of ascertaining the class exists 
based, in whole or in part, on that database. 
 
Id. at 440–41.  We emphasized that “[a]ffidavits, in 
combination with records or other reliable and administratively 
feasible means, can meet the ascertainability standard,” id. at 
441, and that “[t]he only factual inquiry required to determine 
class membership is whether a particular dealership in the 
database received the BMW fax on one of the dates in 
question,” id. at 442.7 
 
7 Since Marcus, judges on our Court have warned that 
the overzealous application of the “administratively feasible” 
requirement will defeat the purpose of Rule 23 to protect the 
rights of individuals who may lack the resources to bring 
individual claims.  Judge Fuentes has pointed out that other 
Circuits to address ascertainability—including the Second, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—have rejected it.   
See City Select, 867 F.3d at 443 n.3, 448 (Fuentes, J., 
concurring); see also Byrd, 784 F.3d 172 (Rendell, J., 
concurring) (“Our heightened ascertainability requirement . . . 
narrows the availability of class actions in a way that the 
drafters of Rule 23 could not have intended.”).  Some have 
warned that applying a heightened ascertainability standard 
could be used to punish plaintiffs where defendants fail to keep 
accurate records.  Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 
WL 3887938, at *3 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J., 
dissenting from denial of en banc review); Byrd, 784 F.3d at 
173 (Rendell, J., concurring) (accord).  See also Briseno v. 
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1125–26 (9th Cir.) 
(holding that class proponents were not required to 





2. The District Court Misapplied the 
Ascertainability Standard 
 
 The District Court misapplied our ascertainability case 
law.  It was too exacting and essentially demanded that 
Appellants identify the class members at the certification stage.  
But all that is required is that Appellants show there is a 
“reliable and administratively feasible mechanism,” Byrd, 784 
F.3d at 163 (quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306), for 
determining class membership.  They have met that 
requirement.    
 
Appellants produced evidence that could be used to 
identify which drivers worked for Sleepy’s full time.  They 
produced testimony from a dozen potential class members 
stating they were required to work exclusively for Sleepy’s 
full-time.  It set delivery routes that ran about 10 hours each 
day.  Because of this 10-hour minimum workday, the drivers 
routinely worked more than 40 hours per week.  Appellants 
produced evidence that the drivers were wholly reliant on 
Sleepy’s for their income and, as a practical matter, were not 
able to perform deliveries for anyone else.   
 
Moreover, pay statements showed that delivery drivers 
completed multiple deliveries each day, five to six days a week, 
and Sleepy’s manifests listed the driver of the truck and how 
many deliveries they were assigned each day.  Pay statements 
also listed amounts that were deducted from the driver’s pay, 
including the reason for the deductions.   
 
determine who was in the class for it to be certified), cert. 





Sleepy’s maintained driver rosters listing the names of 
the individuals who contracted with it; who could drive under 
their contracts (including the signee and, if the signee had more 
than one truck, the names of the secondary drivers approved to 
drive the other trucks who are not members of the proposed 
class); and how many trucks the driver operated for Sleepy’s.  
Sleepy’s security gate logs further show who was driving the 
truck through the gate each day.  Appellants correlated the logs 
with concurrent pay statements and showed that a driver 
personally performed deliveries for Sleepy’s nearly every day 
his truck was on the road.  Appellants thus identified several 
distinct data sets that, taken together with the affidavits, 
establish a “reliable and administratively feasible mechanism” 
for determining class membership.  Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 
(quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306).   
 
Compare our case to Marcus, 687 F.3d 583, and 
Carrera, 727 F.3d 300, where we held the proposed classes 
were not ascertainable, respectively, because the entities sued 
were not the ones with the necessary records, and it was not 
clear that any records existed.  In both cases we remanded for 
the district court to determine further whether there were any 
records at all.  Here we are stacks away from such a dearth of 
documents.  Appellants obtained thousands of records from 
Sleepy’s and have explained how they can use them to identify 
individual drivers who worked full-time.   
 
We have held that the ascertainability standard was 
satisfied in cases in which plaintiffs submitted far less evidence 
than here.  In Byrd, for example, we held that the household 
class members were ascertainable even though no evidence as 




types of evidence that could be identified and used to link the 
existing class members to household members.  784 F.3d at 
170–71.  Here we need not use our imagination.  We know 
there are multiple sets of evidence that can be matched with 
and verified by the putative class members’ affidavits.  And 
indeed the District Court used this same set of evidence to 
determine on the merits that the named plaintiffs were 
employees.   
 
We made clear in City Select that “[a]ffidavits, in 
combination with records or other reliable and administratively 
feasible means, can meet the ascertainability standard.”  867 
F.3d at 441.  There we held the class of car dealerships was 
ascertainable even though the database did not list which 
dealerships received unsolicited faxes because the database in 
combination with the potential class members’ affidavits 
would allow the class to be defined.  Id. at 441–42.  So too 
here.    
 
To be sure, the records Appellants rely on are 
incomplete.  The District Court held that it could not rely on 
those records to determine which drivers drove full-time.  But 
it failed to explain why, in light of our precedents, the records 
as a whole, together with the affidavits, did not provide a 
reliable and feasible mechanism to ascertain class members at 
the certification stage.  Appellants do not have to prove at this 
stage that each proposed class member was indeed a full-time 
driver, but only that the members can be identified.  See City 
Select, 867 F.3d at 439; Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.  Appellants have 
done exactly that by presenting large samples of Sleepy’s 
driver rosters, gate logs, and pay statements.  And the gaps in 
the record do not undermine the conclusion that all the 




determine who the full-time drivers were.  See Carrow, 2019 
WL 7184548, at *6 (holding plaintiffs could show which 
drivers worked full-time even though they “cannot account for 
what each driver was doing during every minute of every day 
throughout the class period”).  Sleepy’s relies on Carrera to 
argue that Appellants failed to obtain enough documents, but 
there the defendant had no records of who purchased the drug 
and the plaintiffs failed to seek any records from third parties 
or even to show that those records existed.  See 727 F.3d at 
308–09.  To repeat, Appellants here obtained thousands of 
pages of documents.   
 
Many of Sleepy’s factual arguments also do not hold up.  
For example, it claims that the Outside Carrier Expense Detail 
reports and pay statements are not useful because they do not 
list the name of the person driving the truck.  But the pay 
statements list the driver identification listed in the driver roster 
(tied to a known individual) and list what days a driver had a 
truck on the road, how many deliveries that truck made, what 
the driver was paid, and what deductions were made from the 
drivers’ pay by Sleepy’s and why.  Sleepy’s also contends that 
the gate logs do not show who actually drove the truck, but 
drivers were required to show their Sleepy’s identification 
badge at a security gate when they arrived at its warehouse and 
when they left to make their deliveries after the truck was 
loaded, plus the identity of the driver was listed under the 
heading “Driver Name.”  J.A. 880.  Perhaps most audaciously, 
Sleepy’s suggests that its own driver rosters should be 
disregarded because it is unclear that they are accurate.  
However, the rosters list the identification numbers assigned to 
each driver and that same identification appears on each pay 
statement.  And the former dispatch supervisor for Sleepy’s 




were approved to drive the trucks and whether they were 
drivers or helpers.  She made clear that drivers not approved to 
make the delivery run would “lose their run” and that only 
approved drivers appeared on the roster.  J.A. 889.  
 
Sleepy’s argues as well that which drivers were paid 
overtime is not ascertainable because it is possible that the 
corporate entities separately paid their individual drivers 
overtime and thus complied with New Jersey law.  But the 
deductions they were subject to were discernible from Sleepy’s 
Outside Carrier Expense Detail reports, which show what 
deductions were made from which trucks.  And the exact 
damages owed each driver is not an ascertainability issue.  See 
Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 F.3d 1150, 1155 
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “the need for individual damages 
calculations does not, alone, defeat class certification”). 
 
Sleepy’s also points us to evidence that certain 
individual drivers did not work full time.  For example, Brian 
Martin signed an IDA but he was not a full-time driver for 
Sleepy’s, as his business did not deliver exclusively for it and 
he rarely drove his own truck.  Sleepy’s notes that the gate logs 
Appellants rely on show that Martin was at the Robbinsville 
facility briefly on certain days, but fail to reflect whether he 
came to the facility multiple times or made any other deliveries 
for other customers that day.  This misses the point.  Martin is 
no longer part of the proposed class.  Appellants concede that 
not all drivers were full-time drivers for Sleepy’s.  They have 
attempted to narrow their class definition to exclude 
individuals whose record is as incomplete as Martin’s.  
Moreover, even if Martin were still included in the proposed 
class, it would have been an issue of overbreadth, not 




drivers would have been included in the proposed class.  As we 
held in Byrd, a class can still be ascertainable even if it may be 
slightly overbroad.  784 F.3d at 168–69.  And it is not clear that 
there is an overbreadth issue with the new proposed class of 
111 drivers. 
 
Thus we reverse the District Court’s holding with 
respect to ascertainability.  The class members are identifiable 
through objective criteria—they are listed in Sleepy’s 
contracts, driver rosters, gate logs, pay statements, and other 
data.  Many of the putative class members have been deposed.  
The District Court improperly focused on perceived gaps in the 
evidence—gaps that were plausibly created by Sleepy’s own 
record keeping.8 
 
8 To be clear, before us is only the May 2019 order 
denying certification of the class of 111 individuals who 
performed deliveries on a full-time basis and who drove one 
truck for Sleepy’s.  Although the Court incorporated by 
reference portions of its February 2018 order denying 
certification of the class of 193, the denial of that certification 
motion is not before us.  So Appellants may move forward with 
their proposed class of 111.   
 
Additionally, although ascertainability does not stand as 
a bar to class certification, we express no opinion on whether 
the other requirements for certification under Rule 23 are 
satisfied.  The District Court did not consider the issue, and we 
decline to do so in the first instance.   
 
On remand, if the parties further litigate the other 
requirements of Rule 23 or if they reach the merits, the District 




3.  Employers’ Failure to Keep Records as a 
Roadblock to Class Certification  
 
That the District Court focused on the gaps in the record 
is especially troubling given that Appellants are only able to 
rely on the records that Sleepy’s kept and produced.  We 
reverse and remand based on the District Court’s 
misapplication of our ascertainability precedent, but we also 
clarify that where an employer’s lack of records makes it more 
difficult to ascertain members of an otherwise objectively 
verifiable class, the employees who make up that class will not 
be made to bear the cost of the employer’s faulty record 
keeping.   
 
To hold otherwise would be in tension with the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. 680, and Tyson 
Foods, 136 S. Ct. 1036, which held that employees’ wage 
claims should not suffer simply due to an employer’s failure to 
maintain employee pay records that it is required to keep by 
law.  In Tyson Foods, the Supreme Court explained that the 
“‘remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public policy 
which it embodies . . . militate against making’ the burden of 
proving uncompensated work ‘an impossible hurdle for the 
employee.’”  136 S. Ct. at 1047 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687).  Employees can meet 
their burdens of proof by “produc[ing] sufficient evidence to 
 
the record, especially given that Sleepy’s may have more 
documents that cover a wider timespan.  And Sleepy’s will in 
any event at the merits stage be able to present evidence as to 
any of the 111 drivers to show that he or she was not in fact a 
full-time driver.  But these are questions for a later stage in this 




show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and 
reasonable inference.”  Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687.  Those 
inferences are often necessary “to fill an evidentiary gap 
created by the employer’s failure to keep adequate records.”  
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047.   
 
We extend the holdings of Tyson Foods and Mt. 
Clemens to the ascertainability determination at the class-
certification stage and hold that where an employer has failed 
to keep records it was required to keep by law, employees can 
prove ascertainability (it remains their burden) by producing 
“sufficient evidence” to define their proposed class as “a matter 
of just and reasonable inference.”  Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 
687; Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–47 (holding that 
plaintiffs may use representative samples to establish “the 
employees’ hours worked in a class action”).   
 
For purposes of our case, the New Jersey Wage and 
Hour Law provides that “[a]ll the time the employee is required 
to be at his or her place of work or on duty shall be counted as 
hours worked.”  N.J. Admin. Code § 12:56-5.2(a).  An 
employer is required to keep accurate records showing the 
names of its employees, days and hours worked, and other 
information.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a20; N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 12:56-4.1.  Sleepy’s thus had an obligation to keep clear 
employment records.  It apparently failed to do so for the 
members of the proposed class.   
 
Sleepy’s argues that it acted in good faith when it failed 
to keep complete records for the proposed class members 
because it believed they were independent contractors and not 
employees.  If we accept this argument and allow Appellants’ 




would be creating an incentive for employers not to keep 
records and thus avoid potential lawsuits.  We thus would be 
crafting a vast loophole to class certification; employers could 
simply argue that they believed the potential class members 
were not employees.  This would lead to paradoxical outcomes.  
Cf. Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 540 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (“[C]lass action litigation grows out of systemic 
failures of administration, policy application, or records 
management that result in small monetary losses to large 
numbers of people.  To allow that same systemic failure to 
defeat class certification would undermine the very purpose of 
class action remedies.”).   
 
It cannot be the case that Mt. Clemens and Tyson Foods 
do not apply anytime an employer argues workers in good faith 
were not treated as employees but as independent contractors.  
If this were so, no court would be able to use those precedents 
to determine damages where a defendant misclassified its 
workers as independent contractors or otherwise misclassified 
employees.  We simply follow the path of the Supreme Court 
that in cases such as this one, where employment records are 
lacking, the employer and not the employee will bear the cost 
of such deficiencies, whether they be intentional or good-faith 
misclassifications.  While this does not mean plaintiffs can 
avoid the ascertainability requirement, it does allow just and 
reasonable inferences to fill in the gaps in a defendant’s faulty 
record keeping.  
* * * * * 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and remand this case for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.   
“In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow 
the principle of party presentation.” United States v. Sineneng-
Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). This assumes that “parties 
represented by competent counsel know what is best for them, 
and are responsible for advancing the . . . argument entitling 
them to relief.” Id. (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 
375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment)) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). So 
“courts normally decide only questions presented by the 
parties.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). 
Because the Majority neglects this principle to reach an issue 
Appellants failed to raise properly, I respectfully dissent. 
Appellants filed a renewed motion for class certification 
that the District Court construed as a motion for 
reconsideration. The Court reasoned: 
Plaintiffs must meet a higher standard than 
before—they must show that either there has 
been a change in the controlling case law[] (they 
have not); new evidence is available that was not 
available when the Court denied the motion (they 
have not); or the need to correct a clear error of 
law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice (they 
have not). 
Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, 2019 WL 8881823, at *7 (D.N.J. 
2019). Appellants failed to present the issue of whether the 
District Court erred in applying this standard. Nevertheless, my 
colleagues conclude the District Court erred in “treat[ing] the 
renewed motion for class certification as a motion for 
reconsideration.” Maj. Op. 4–5. They do so apparently based 
 2 
on a footnote in the procedural history section of Appellants’ 
brief. See Hargrove Br. 11 n.12. But we have held that is 
insufficient to raise an issue or argument. See, e.g., Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33, 53 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(arguments and issues “relegated to a footnote” are forfeited) 
(citing United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify 
or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that 
issue on appeal.”), and John Wyeth & Bro. v. CIGNA Int’l 
Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments 
raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely 
argued, are considered waived.”)). Moreover, Rule 28(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 28.1(a) of the 
Third Circuit Local Appellate Rules require appellants “to set 
forth the issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in 
support of those issues in their opening brief.” Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The Majority contends Appellants did more than raise 
this issue in a footnote because they “elaborated in detail in 
their Reply.” Maj. Op. 17 n.5. That’s not enough. Appellants 
must present and argue each issue “in their opening brief.” 
Kost, 1 F.3d at 182 (emphasis added). We have never (until 
now, apparently) established an exception to this rule where 
the appellee addresses the issue and the appellant subsequently 
“elaborate[s]” in the reply brief, or where the parties are not 
“surprised” because the district court “expressly discussed and 
ruled on the . . . issue.” Maj. Op. 17 n.5. And for good reason. 
Such an exception will destabilize our forfeiture jurisprudence 
and undermine our clear and easily administrable rule. It will 
also invite mischief by permitting appellants to raise issues and 
arguments summarily in an opening brief, thus forcing 
appellees to guess at the questions presented and appellant’s 
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specific arguments, before presenting their full argument in a 
reply brief. This impairs our deliberative process. 
 The Majority cites several cases it believes support its 
decision to reach this issue. Id. None of them do. It cites Lark 
v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 645 
F.3d 596, 607 (3d Cir. 2011), and Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 
252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005), which discuss notice in the district 
court and our discretion to address issues waived below but 
raised properly on appeal. Neither case supports the Majority’s 
decision because here we deal only with an issue not raised 
properly on appeal. Next, my colleagues cite In re: Asbestos 
Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 (3d 
Cir. 2017), for their position that we should excuse forfeiture 
when, despite an appellant’s failure to raise an issue properly 
in accordance with our well-settled precedent and the Federal 
and Local Rules of Appellate Procedure, the parties 
nevertheless have fair notice of the claim. In Asbestos, as in 
this appeal, appellants tried to preserve an issue in a footnote 
while committing their entire opening brief to other issues. We 
held that an “attempt to shoehorn in an argument” in a footnote 
is “insufficient to raise an issue on appeal,” and that “[a]s a 
general matter, an appellant waives an argument in support of 
reversal if it is not raised in the opening brief.” Id. We should 
apply the same rule here. 
Consistent with our longstanding precedent, I would 
affirm the District Court and hold that Appellants failed to 
present and argue the issue of whether the Court erred in 
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denying their renewed motion for class certification under the 
motion-for-reconsideration standard.1 
 I also disagree with the Majority’s conclusion on the 
merits. On the record before it, I cannot say the District Court 
abused its discretion in holding Appellants failed to establish 
ascertainability. 
 Appellants failed to show that the class was currently 
and readily ascertainable. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 
687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012). They consistently presented 
a confused and incomplete method for ascertaining class 
members, which led the Court to its holding on ascertainability. 
The District Court did not reach this conclusion for lack of 
trying. It considered substantial briefing, heard argument, and 
allowed the parties to depose Appellants’ key witness when 
their methodology remained unclear. Despite these 
 
1 Setting aside Appellants’ forfeiture, I disagree with my 
colleagues’ broad holding that a district court can never apply 
the motion-for-reconsideration standard to a renewed motion 
for class certification. See Maj. Op. 5 (“Courts cannot 
graft . . . the heightened motion-for-reconsideration standard 
[onto renewed motions for class certification].”). District 
courts have “ample discretion to consider (or to decline to 
consider) a revised class certification motion after an initial 
denial.” In re: Tropicana Orange Juice Mktg. & Sales 
Practices Litig., 2018 WL 6819331, at *2 (D.N.J. 2018) 
(quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 483 F.3d 70, 73 
(2d Cir. 2007)). Because district courts may decline to consider 
such motions at all, it stands to reason that they retain 
discretion to apply the reconsideration standard. 
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opportunities, Appellants failed to establish ascertainability by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
 As just one example of Appellants’ shortcomings, 
consider the gate logs presented (and not presented) at the class 
certification stage. Appellants have consistently said Sleepy’s 
gate logs are a key component of their ascertainability 
methodology. See, e.g., App. 1412 (Appellants’ witness 
testified that the only way she could show a particular driver 
drove on a particular day was by cross-referencing an Outside 
Carrier Expense Detail report with the gate log). But even after 
discovery, Appellants failed to obtain gate logs for the full 
class period. And the logs they presented (from a few months 
in 2008 and 2009) were missing data. For that reason, the 
District Court questioned the reliability of those documents in 
Appellants’ ascertainability analysis. And Appellants are to 
blame for this evidentiary defect because Sleepy’s offered to 
provide all its gate logs but Appellants claimed it was “not 
[Appellants’] burden to review all of the gate logs . . . prior to 
class certification.” Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Renewed Motion for Class Certification, Case No. 3:10-cv-
01138, ECF No. 225, 11 n.15. So the District Court 
unsurprisingly concluded Appellants failed to meet their 
burden for ascertainability given their willful ignorance of the 
existence and substance of a central category of evidence. 
 Finally, in reversing the District Court’s ascertainability 
determination, the Majority extends the holdings of Anderson 
v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), and Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). Maj. Op. 
6 (“[W]here an employer has failed to keep records it was 
required to keep by law, employees can prove ascertainability 
by producing ‘sufficient evidence’ to define their proposed 
class as ‘a matter of just and reasonable inference.’”) (quoting 
 6 
Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687, and Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 
1046–47). I would not apply those precedents to this case 
because there was never any doubt that the plaintiffs in Mt. 
Clemens and Tyson Foods were employees. Here, the company 
in good faith believed the drivers were independent 
contractors. The District Court agreed with that classification, 
and only after the New Jersey Supreme Court held otherwise 
did they learn that the drivers were employees. See Hargrove 
v. Sleepy’s LLC, 2016 WL 8258865, at *1 (D.N.J. 2016); see 
also Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, Case Nos. 12-2540 & 12-2541, 
Petition for Certification of Question of Law (“We believe that 
this case raises an important issue of New Jersey law that is 
both determinative and novel.”).  
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the order of the 
District Court and respectfully dissent.  
